- Title Pages
- The main Greek political parties
- 1 Was Greece ready for the euro?<sup>1</sup>
- 2 New Democracy’s criminal indifference
- 3 PASOK’s opportunistic optimism
- 4 Being in denial
- 5 Ineffective solutions
- 6 The bitter truth
- 7 The first Memorandum: a medicine with dangerous side-effects
- 8 The crisis spreads to the Union
- 9 Implementing the Memorandum: an obstacle race
- 10 An ‘all-encompassing plan’ to solve the crisis in the Eurozone?
- 11 An ‘all-encompassing plan’ to solve the crisis in Greece?
- 12 A year of the Memorandum: seeking a new solution
- 13 Debt restructuring: the decisions of 21 July 2011
- 14 A dead end
- 15 More hitches
- 16 The new solution
- 17 Political games with unpredictable consequences
- 18 A flicker of hope
- 19 Conflicts at the highest European level
- 20 The new agreement with the Eurozone (the second Memorandum) and private sector involvement
- 21 An evaluation of the Memoranda
- 22 Austerity and growth: implementing the second Memorandum
- 23 The crisis peaks
- 24 The election of 6 May: euro or drachma?
- 25 Cracks in the euro
- 26 The Union at a dead end: change of course on 29 June
- 27 The election of 17 June: a new beginning?
- 28 Provisional solutions, October–June 2013
- 29 Evaluations of the assistance programme to Greece
- 30 Cyprus
- 31 The causes of the crisis were not only economic
- 32 A new European policy is necessary
- Appendix Key meetings and decisions of the institutions of the European Union relating to the financial crisis
- Trajectory of the Greek financial crisis
The crisis peaks
The crisis peaks
- (p.225) 23 The crisis peaks
- The European debt crisis
- Manchester University Press
The chapter discusses developments in the Eurozone during the early months of 2012. It is argued that in Greece the Papademos government was fatally undermined by the unwillingness of the coalition partners to endow it with a longer-term mission. Yet, the prospect of a new election halted the domestic reform momentum. At the European level, hopes for the containment of the crisis did not materialise as both Italy and Spain remained under severe pressure from the markets. The prospect of an imminent Lehman Brothers moment for the European economy alarmed the US which pressed Germany for a relaxation of austerity in the Eurozone, but to no avail. The election of Hollande in France raised expectations in Greece that the German policy was about to be reversed. Such expectations, however, proved rather unrealistic.
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