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Inclusion, Exclusion and the Governance of European Security$

Mark Webber

Print publication date: 2007

Print ISBN-13: 9780719061486

Published to Manchester Scholarship Online: July 2012

DOI: 10.7228/manchester/9780719061486.001.0001

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Inclusion, exclusion and the international politics of the Cold War

Inclusion, exclusion and the international politics of the Cold War

Chapter:
(p.27) 2 Inclusion, exclusion and the international politics of the Cold War
Source:
Inclusion, Exclusion and the Governance of European Security
Author(s):

Mark Webber

Publisher:
Manchester University Press
DOI:10.7228/manchester/9780719061486.003.0002

Abstract and Keywords

In a book intended to have a contemporary bearing, it may seem idiosyncratic to devote an entire chapter to the Cold War. There are, after all, other more recent episodes which could be said to have shaped international politics and to which connections can be drawn with the book's central concerns of inclusion/exclusion and security. Yet security relations in Europe, both at present and for the foreseeable future, will be shaped more by the legacies of the Cold War than by any other set of circumstances. This chapter examines how Europe's security relations shifted from a politics of exclusion during the Cold War to one with a more inclusive dynamic; an inclusiveness, however, based on the particular circumstances of power and the weight of international institutions at the Cold War's end. After considering the bloc logic of the Cold War, it discusses the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the emergence of European integration, the ideology of the Cold War, and the end of the Cold War and the possibilities and limits of inclusion.

Keywords:   Cold War, inclusion, exclusion, international politics, Europe, security relations, bloc logic, ideology, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, European integration

In a volume intended to have a contemporary bearing, it may seem idiosyncratic to devote an entire chapter to the Cold War. There are, after all, other more recent episodes which could be said to have shaped international politics and to which connections can be drawn with the book’s central concerns of inclusion/exclusion and security. Yet security relations in Europe, both at present and for the foreseeable future, will be shaped more by the legacies of the Cold War than by any other set of circumstances. In global terms and even more so in the European context, the end of the Cold War continues to be more important than other assumed historical turning points, be this the 1999 Kosovo war, ‘9/11’, or the 2003 Iraq crisis. To none of the latter can we attach the sort of description Adam Roberts levelled at the late 1980s and early 1990s – a point at which a ‘new era of international relations’ was ushered in and a shift occurred to ‘a time which is fundamentally different from all past eras’.1

None of this is to minimise the profound impact of these other points of change. For instance, 9/11 has been seen as making the world a ‘different place’. It fundamentally altered American foreign policy (contributing in response to foreign policy change in a range of other states), marked a shift in the regional politics of Central and West Asia and the Middle East, and invigorated worldwide, debates on human rights, globalisation and global justice.2 Yet 9/11 could not be said to have altered the international order in quite the same way that the end of superpower rivalry, in parallel with the fall of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union did in the two short years between late 1989 and the end of 1991.3 These events overturned a system of international relations which had appeared to most observers as permanent and which had shaped international (and domestic) political, economic and cultural structures for over four decades. The suddenness of this shift, the fact that it had occurred in the (p.28) absence of war, and the ideological and political consequences it entailed meant a truly historic juncture had been passed.4 The events of 9/11 also had much less of a European focus. In Europe, the end of communism and the Soviet Union ushered in a wave of state creation and regime change throughout the continent’s Eastern half. Bloc rivalry also disappeared taking with it some international institutions and forcing upon others fundamental questions of purpose and relevance.

The manner in which this reconfiguration occurred is covered below but it is preceded by a consideration of the bloc logic of the Cold War. The purpose here is to consider how Europe’s security relations shifted from a politics of exclusion during the Cold War to one with a more inclusive dynamic; an inclusiveness, however, based on the particular circumstances of power and the weight of international institutions at the Cold War’s end.

The Cold War and exclusion

The term ‘Cold War’ has multiple meanings and, according to who you read, different periodisations.5 Without entering here into debates on the Cold War’s origins, specific duration, or who was responsible for its persistence, it is nonetheless possible to identify one of its basic defining qualities, namely a fundamental division between two rival blocs. According to John Lewis Gaddis, this amounted to ‘the most remarkable polarisation of politics in modern history’. ‘It was as if’, Gaddis continues, ‘a gigantic magnet had somehow come into existence (in the international system), compelling most states, often even movements and individuals within states, to align themselves along fields of force thrown out from either Washington or Moscow’.6 This division had global consequences; it was, however, most keenly apparent in Europe. Here superpower ‘overlay’ was at its most pronounced – Europe was, to quote Barry Buzan et al., ‘the nut in the nutcracker of a global rivalry’.7

This division has been viewed in various ways: as a clash of social systems, reinforced in turn by ideological incompatibilities; as a geopolitical contest between two great powers; as the outcome of the nefarious intentions of individual leaders (Joseph Stalin, in particular); or as the unintended consequence of misinterpretation and escalatory action-reaction cycles of behaviour.8 What all these interpretations hold in common, however, is a notion that the Cold War was characterised by mutual antagonism. This was at its most profound in the decade up until the mid–1950s, giving way thereafter to the coexistence but not the elimination of irreconcilable difference. What was ruled out was the acceptance by one side of the other’s claims in the international system or its assertions of superiority in domestic political and economic organisation. In this sense, truly mutual security was illusory. Whether based on misperception or a misconstruing of the other side’s intentions, policy was driven in these circumstances by an assumption that the best that could be obtained was a modus (p.29) vivendi between blocs in which each side nonetheless viewed the other as rival and potential aggressor.9

Bloc logic

The existence of two competing political-military blocs was reflected in the consolidation of spheres of influence. These were characterised by intense relations among their members and the exercise of leadership by a dominant state (respectively, the US and the Soviet Union); relations between blocs meanwhile were limited. The demarcation of these spheres was apparent in Europe in a very physical sense – the ‘iron curtain’ ran through Central Europe, divided Germany, and prevented the movement of peoples across the continent from east to west. Overlapping this physical division was an institutional one. Western Europe was organised around NATO (thus ensuring a solid attachment to North America), the EC/European Economic Community (EEC)10 and, to some degree, the Council of Europe. Eastern Europe, meanwhile, was shaped by the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Of these various institutions, military alliances were the most salient form of East-West competition. The formation of NATO in 1949 and of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 solidified Europe’s political division and bloc leadership, and grafted on to it a profoundly important military-cum-strategic element. These alliances did not embrace the entire continent but between them took in up to twenty-four states. Their formation served, in part, a straightforward military purpose by adding to the assets of the two superpowers. But equally, alliances served an exclusionary function: to limit the room for expansion of the other power into those regions considered of vital interest. Once the bloc system had become established in the mid–1950s it was assumed that territorial encroachment would be met by massive retaliation, if necessary involving a recourse to nuclear weapons. Of course, this was a far from straightforward strategy. It did not rule out brinkmanship, as in the case of Soviet moves during the Berlin crises of 1958–62, nor did it pass without controversy within the alliances themselves, hence the periodic debates within NATO over nuclear control and deployment. These strategic considerations did, however, make very clear the material consequences of the antagonism and, through a logic of deterrence, in effect, stabilised the bloc system.

In effect, a tacit but mutual recognition developed over the status of spheres of influence. During the initial post-war years there had been some uncertainty in this regard. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill were both of the view that the Soviet Union had legitimate security interests in Eastern Europe. By contrast, Roosevelt’s successor, Harry Truman was publicly opposed to a Soviet sphere of influence but the large Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe ruled out an active strategy to reverse communist gains. US policies such as the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine and support for the formation of NATO were thus premised not on overturning Soviet influence but, rather, containing it. Throughout the 1950s Western politicians did talk of the ‘roll-back’ of (p.30) communism but the reluctance of the US, or indeed any of the NATO powers, to exploit anti-Soviet insurgencies in East Germany in 1953 or Hungary in 1956 demonstrated, according to Mark Mazower just ‘how uninterested the West was in challenging the prevailing balance of power’.11 Thereafter, a competition for spheres of influence only seriously applied to the East-West antagonism in areas outside of Europe. Thus, the West stood by at the time of the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and also during the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981. Not until the advent of the Reagan administration in the US in 1981 was the legitimacy of communist rule and of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe seriously questioned. Yet it was not a topic of superpower summits and Western states refrained from sponsoring debates on the matter in forums such as the UN. None of this meant that the West explicitly welcomed Soviet rule, only that the pragmatic judgement was followed that very little could be done to remove it. Subversion did, of course, take place in the murky world of espionage and through the broadcasting operations of stations such as Radio Free Europe, but the ‘basic decisions’ taken by governments, were essentially based on the maintenance of a ‘primitive international system’ geared to the avoidance of nuclear war. Deterrence, crisis management, and the existence of spheres of influence themselves were all material to this end.12

The maintenance of this system required, of course, acquiescence on the Soviet side. The Soviet Union emerged from the Second World War as a victorious but exhausted power. Military and political presences in Eastern Europe were ‘the facts on the ground’ of its defeat of Nazi Germany. This presence Stalin sought to maintain because it accorded with the ideological imperatives of a socialist state, the realpolitik calculations of balancing Anglo-American influence and the strategic desire to establish a buffer against any future threats to Soviet security (including, the defeat of Nazism notwithstanding, revanchism in Germany). But Stalin was cautious in extending Soviet influence beyond those areas of Europe in which the Red Army had a presence, a circumspection born of losses during the war and the American determination to protect Western Europe. The Soviet Union thus gave only very limited support to the communist side in the Greek civil war and refrained from using force against the Titoist deviation in Yugoslavia. Moscow was, however, determined to consolidate existing positions. This was evidenced by the formation of the Cominform and the articulation of the ‘two-camp’ thesis (both in 1947), the sovietisation of Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade (1948), and the creation of CMEA (1949).

Soviet policy after Stalin’s death did not deviate in its fundamentals from this bloc logic. In 1955 Moscow recognised the Federal Republic of Germany (and thus de facto the division of Germany) and was the moving force behind the formation of the Warsaw Pact (a response, in part, to the decision taken in 1954 by the Western allies to arm West Germany and see it enter into NATO). In fact, by this point ‘bloc formation had reached its […] internal limits on both sides (p.31) […]. Both sides had secured their spheres of influence and neither was able to coerce the other against its will on important issues […].’13

The existence of exclusive spheres of influence did not mean that Europe was divided in a clear-cut fashion. A first qualification to note in this regard was the difference between the spheres of influence themselves. The Soviet bloc was imposed, created to service the interests of Moscow and offered very little room for manoeuvre for those within it. Exceptions did occur. Yugoslavia managed to avoid entanglement in the Warsaw Pact and CMEA altogether; Albania, a founding member of both organisations, exited the former in 1968 and ceased participation in the latter in 1961; and Romania, while retaining its membership, was able from the late 1960s to pursue a semi-autonomous foreign and security policy. Yet where Soviet interests were considered vital, any signs of independence were smothered (as in the cases of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland noted above). The Western bloc was of a very different order. While NATO bore the imprint of US leadership, this was a leadership that was welcomed, indeed even encouraged by the Europeans.14 Further, within NATO American leadership was not contrary to fundamental West European security interests and the Europeans were able to influence the Americans to some degree even on military matters. Where differences were apparent (over nuclear weapons policy, for instance) the US was sometimes openly challenged, even though the fundamental existence of the alliance with Washington remained unquestioned. Finally, there was a clear contrast between Eastern and Western Europe as blocs in terms of the manner in which economic integration proceeded and the strategic considerations which flowed from this. Under Soviet aegis, economic relations organised through CMEA were intended to benefit the hegemonic power even though in practice, the East European states became an increasing burden to Moscow. In the case of the West Europeans, economic integration was supported by the US but did not directly involve it other than during its early stages. From the time of the Marshall Plan, through American support of the European Steel and Coal Community and subsequently the EC, the US viewed integration as desirable for a variety of reasons. It conformed to an American model of free markets and democracy and was a tool both for containing the Soviet Union and integrating West Germany amongst its neighbours. American support cooled from the late 1960s as European integration began to pose challenges to American economic and political leadership of the West, but these basic calculations nonetheless remained.15

A second qualification concerns those parts of Europe formally outside the bloc structure of the Cold War. The relevant states in this regard included, first, the neutrals (namely Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland), and second the somewhat exceptional cases of Yugoslavia and Albania. All these states, in some senses counted themselves as separate from the continent’s two organising blocs, even if the motives and circumstances of this detachment were different in each case. Their position blurred only slightly, however, the basic bloc division. In each case, domestic political and economic systems were clearly (p.32) recognisable as falling into one or other camp and, in the case of the neutrals, this was reflected additionally in external economic relations. In strategic terms also a form of bloc orientation was at least implicit during the Cold War. With the possible exception of Finland, NATO strategy assumed a defence of those states adjacent to the Soviet bloc (i.e. Austria and Sweden) even though they were outside of alliance membership. The military planning of the neutrals themselves was geared, in part, to an awareness of this eventuality.16 As for Yugoslavia and Albania, these two held an initial allegiance to Moscow, subsequently broke with the Soviet Union, yet at the same time retained a socialist system and refrained from moving closer diplomatically to the West.

A third qualification relates to the tentative development of pan-European forms of organisation These were, almost by definition, in contradiction with the bloc logic of the Cold War and, by that very fact, were circumscribed in how far they could develop. The nature of this contradiction was evident from the very earliest point of the Cold War. The ‘Declaration on Liberated Europe’ adopted at the Yalta conference in 1945 and the four-power responsibility for Germany agreed shortly after at Potsdam, could be interpreted as ‘the basis of a new European order’ stretching throughout the continent based upon democracy, free elections, the rule of law and quadripartite cooperation among the four wartime powers of France, Britain, the US and the Soviet Union. It was precisely the descent of the continent into spheres of influence and Cold War antagonism from the late 1940s which put paid to this vision.17 Thereafter, initiatives ostensibly aimed at cross-bloc cooperation occurred periodically. A brief period of East-West rapprochement blossomed during the mid–1950s (one lasting product of which was the withdrawal in 1955 of the occupying powers from Austria and the signing of the Austrian State Treaty). During the 1960s the French President Charles De Gaulle pursued a friendly policy towards Moscow, placing this within a vision of a Europe ‘from the Atlantic to the Urals’. West Germany under Chancellor Willy Brandt, meanwhile sought an improvement in relations with both Moscow and its Eastern neighbours. This Ostpolitik saw the signing of a non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union (1970), a treaty of normalisation with Poland (1970) and treaty of mutual recognition with East Germany (1972). In parallel, a quadripartite agreement on the status of Berlin was signed in 1971 between the four wartime powers.

During the early 1970s two broader developments also occurred. The first was the launch of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna in 1973 between NATO and the Warsaw Pact; the second was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which took place between July 1973 and August 1975 in Helsinki. The latter was a truly pan-European occasion, involving as it did thirty-two European states (with the exception of Albania) plus Canada and the US, and culminating in the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. Thereafter, the CSCE lived on in periodic follow-up meetings. The main significance of the CSCE ‘process’, as it came to be known, was that it provided a permanent channel of communication between states of the Eastern and Western blocs (as well as the (p.33) neutrals), a code of conduct on inter-state relations (contained in ‘Basket One’ of the Final Act) and a programme of security cooperation (notably in the field of confidence-building measures). It can also be credited with placing issues on the agenda of East-West relations that had previously been taboo. This included human rights most notably; the CSCE was thus an effective instrument of norm diffusion into Eastern Europe during the Cold War, thereby bolstering societal opposition to communist rule.

Together, these efforts of the late 1960s and early 1970s amounted to a process of détente, notable not only for the relaxation of tension in East-West relations but also for witnessing European-led initiatives and a multilateralisation of relations on the continent. In retrospect, this period may well be judged as a harbinger of later patterns of relations after the Cold War. At the time, however, the perception was that the bloc nature of the continent remained firmly in place even if the two sides had made a significant step away from confrontation. Détente in Europe, and the CSCE process more specifically, was viewed with some suspicion in the US and, indeed, for the Soviet Union, its major achievement was precisely to obtain Western recognition of the political status quo. The Helsinki Final Act did allude to the possibility of changes in borders and, as such, it implied the possibility of both German unification and a weakening of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. However, this possibility seemed a distant prospect in the mid–1970s and if anything détente suggested a continuing toleration in the West of a Soviet sphere of influence.18

A fourth qualification to Europe’s Cold War division relates to the interpenetration of the two blocs. The existence of the iron curtain did not mean that the Western and Eastern halves of Europe were completely sealed. Sporting competition took place across the divide from the very earliest days of the Cold War and, although limited, migration, tourism and cultural and academic exchanges also occurred. One product of détente was to increase these movements, most symbolically within divided Berlin and between East and West Germany. In the economic sphere, meanwhile, détente witnessed an upsurge of East-West trade and Western investment in communist states. The effect of these trends was to link the planned economies of CMEA closer to the market economies of the West. This was not a process, however, that did much to offset the basic dependence of Eastern Europe on the Soviet economy. Neither did it amount to much in the way of pan-European integration. From the early 1970s a number of bilateral agreements were reached between the EC and individual CMEA countries (commonly concerned with trade), but there was very little in the way of EC-CMEA inter-bloc cooperation and, notably, no formal political relations between the two bodies.

The four qualifications above indicate that the East-West division was not as stark as some of the rhetoric of the Cold War might have suggested. However, none of these qualifications detract from the basic condition under discussion – the existence of two competing blocs and thus the existence of processes of mutual exclusion in continental Europe. The bloc configuration of the Cold War ruled (p.34) out, by definition, the development of truly inclusive pan-European processes of political, economic and military integration (the CSCE for all its merits did not provide this). European states, in turn, enjoyed very little freedom of movement in their external orientation and their position within the respective blocs once established was pretty well irreversible. Movement out was rare, while movement between blocs was impossible. Among West European states either manoeuvre was, in any case, inconceivable. Among East Europeans, on the other hand, it was of some hypothetical interest. First because of the Albanian and Yugoslav experiences, and second because geographic position and geopolitical and cultural legacies meant that a more Western orientation was not unnatural for certain states of the region.

Yet this hypothetical possibility aside, for a period of some forty years Europe was, to cite William Wallace, ‘divided between two international orders […] involving two military alliances, two sets of international institutions, two patterns of economic development and interdependence’.19 These orders were, moreover, based on two very different sets of organising principles. In the West among the core states of North America and Western Europe, an order developed after 1945 (and it had roots which go back to 1919) that involved, domestically, pluralistic liberal-capitalist forms of political and economic exchange, and internationally, economic openness, a diffusion of power (that remained consistent with American leadership) and cooperative institutionalisation and integration.20 As will be discussed in Chapter 3, this approximated what Karl Deutsch and others referred to as early as the mid–1950s as a ‘pluralistic security community’, or group of states sharing core values and common institutions, the political elites of which possess a growing sense of shared identity. The subtleties of Deutsch’s formulation need not detain us now, but its key aspect is worth stressing, namely that such a community is premised on ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’.21 The Euro-Atlantic order was thus characterised by the development of NATO and of European integration, the solidity of an American stake in Europe and the eradication of the blight of interstate war.

This security community was not shared with Europe’s Eastern half. The prerequisite of common values was missing, and even if the period of the Cold War has been described as the ‘long peace’,22 the operating assumption on both sides was that the other constituted a material threat. Neither could a security community be said to have cohered within Europe’s Eastern half. The structures of the Warsaw Pact and CMEA could not disguise a lingering popular antipathy to Soviet (i.e. Russian) sway in much of Eastern Europe and significantly, the occasions of Warsaw Pact intervention during the Cold War were not directed against the West but against the Warsaw Pact’s own members. In so far as the socialist bloc held together at all this was the consequence of enforced ideological conformity, a subordination to Soviet interests, and an institutional binding dependent on mutual relations between ruling communist parties. These features allowed little scope for local particularities and were not premised on popular (p.35) support. Soviet coercive oversight, in other words, was the main explanation for the durability of the European communist order.23

Ideology

If the division of the Cold War was derived from the existence of two competing systems of order, then this basic difference was affirmed through ideologically influenced strategic discourse. By ideology is meant here the set of principles and precepts held by public officials which together served as a broad guide to state actions.24 Just how important this clash of ideologies was in explaining the Cold War has been the subject of some debate. Yet as Mark Kramer has argued, ideology, even if insufficient is clearly a necessary part of any explanation. Superpower rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union might have arisen in any case, but the ideological divide between liberal-democratic capitalism and Soviet-style Marxism—Leninism helps account for the scale and intensity of that rivalry.25

Following the more dangerous phase of the Cold War up to the 1950s, ideological discourse did develop some subtleties. In the Soviet case, the ‘two-camp’ thesis gave way to a notion of peaceful coexistence under Nikita Khrushchev and during the 1970s Soviet official thinking under Leonid Brezhnev was capable of ideologically incorporating détente. However, up until the Gorbachev period, the Soviet leadership was wedded to a vision that saw international politics as being divided irreconcilably between socialist and capitalist countries. Coexistence was not ruled out but a permanent reconciliation was impossible owing to the fundamentally different social (i.e. class) character of the two sides.26 With distance, these assumptions now appear clumsy. However, as a wealth of archival and memoir material now shows, ideology did matter to the Soviet leadership, shaping the manner in which foreign policy was formed and implemented.27 Ideological prescriptions help to account for the high level of Soviet militarisation (as a counter to what was regarded as the inherently aggressive nature of capitalist imperialism), the highly regulated nature of Soviet involvement in the global economy, and Soviet defence of socialism in Eastern Europe (if necessary by armed intervention).

This type of ideological thinking reinforced more obvious strategic assessments. In official Soviet and East European parlance, NATO in general and the US in particular were unambiguously identified as the principal military threat to the Warsaw Pact.28 This position was not unwavering throughout the Cold War. Nuance and qualification were apparent depending on changes in the global ‘correlation of forces’,29 changes in American administrations and the development of Soviet military (especially nuclear) capability. However, what is instructive is just how deep-seated this basic strategic position was. Even allowing for propagandistic exaggeration, Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko’s 1984 assessment that the US had ‘pretensions to world domination’ and had converted Western Europe ‘into a launching pad for US nuclear missiles targeted on the USSR’ was hardly different in its essential sense of suspicion and mistrust from (p.36) some of the more lurid descriptions of American and NATO intent current during the Stalin period.30

Western thinking was far less monolithic in nature. The US position was consistently more anti-communist than that of European political elites and, indeed, under certain presidents (Ronald Reagan, most notably) was almost evangelical in its ideological distaste of communist rule. There is no simple explanation for this position, but in essence American political culture and domestic political practice was hardly compatible with that of Soviet-style socialism. The same could have been said about the US and contrasting varieties of authoritarian rule around the world. Yet in practice, during the Cold War the US was able (as were a number of West European states) to conduct perfectly amicable relations with such regimes. The same arguably could have been the case with communist states (and indeed, the US from the early 1970s maintained decent relations with China). Yet what separated communism out (and its Soviet branch more especially), was the perceived commitment on its part to projecting its values abroad, something that helped harden strategic assessments of Soviet power in the West.31 Among (and sometimes within) American and West European governments, assessments of the Soviet ‘threat’ were not uniform and occasionally amounted to open disagreement. Yet whatever the differences of emphasis, certainly among the states of NATO, the threat was considered real, and, indeed, formed the strategic basis of the Alliance’s rationale throughout the Cold War.32

To summarise so far, the juxtaposition of two versions of order during the Cold War did not rule out coexistence and, indeed, periodic tensions notwithstanding, both sides had an interest in stabilising their rivalry in Europe. What this juxtaposition clearly did make impossible, however, was the ascendancy of one version of order without first the substantive revision of the other. As they stood, the underlying principles of international and domestic organisation in the Eastern and Western halves of the continent were irreconcilable. The precondition of the Cold War’s end between 1989–91 could, therefore, only be the moderation of the antagonism in favour of one side.

The end of the Cold War and the possibilities of inclusion

Just as the beginning of the Cold War has no one point of departure, so too its ending has no single point of termination. However, the markers of its demise in Europe were perfectly clear: the collapse of Soviet rule in Europe (heralded by the political transitions of 1989 and formalised by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and CMEA in 1991); the unification of Germany and the entry of the unified state into NATO in 1990; and the politically significant signing of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe by the CSCE participating states in November 1990. Linked to these fundamental trends, Europe also witnessed agreement on a range of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), as well as the beginnings of (p.37) a process of nuclear and conventional disarmament, involving the 1987 Soviet-American Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and the 1990 CFE Treaty, which would regulate conventional armaments levels between the member states of NATO and the (then still extant) Warsaw Pact. Finally, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, while coming after these events, nonetheless confirmed the irreversibility of the Cold War’s end. In the heat of the moment, it seemed that a new period of historic opportunity had opened up, one which would allow of more inclusive structures of security than those permitted during the Cold War.

One of the key voices in this respect was that of the last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev’s instrumental role in ending the Cold War has been hailed in many quarters and it is inconceivable that without Soviet acquiescence the Cold War would have ended quite the way it did.33 Under Gorbachev’s watch Soviet foreign policy jettisoned many long-held assumptions, not least that the Soviet Union should retain an indefinite presence in Eastern Europe, that Germany’s division was irreversible and that a heavy reliance should be placed on military instruments of security. A number of explanations have been forwarded to account for this fundamental shift.34 What most of these share is a view that Soviet policy changed because of some very real material pressures, pressures that had been straining the Soviet regime for years and which by the early 1980s had reached a point of near crisis. A rapprochement with the West has thus been variously seen as: (1) a response to Soviet economic decline and a means of integrating the Soviet economy into an increasingly globalised economy; (2) a capitulation in the face of a more assertively militaristic and anti-communist foreign policy on the part of the first Reagan administration, a retreat made all the more necessary by the sheer strain that military spending was placing on the Soviet economy; and (3) a practical way out of the foreign policy dead ends which Gorbachev’s successors had arrived at and which had seen over-commitment in the Third World, strained relations with China, a severe downturn in relations with the US and, in Europe, the demise of détente.

That Gorbachev was compelled to respond to these factors is obvious. More difficult to explain is the nature of that response. Gorbachev could have chosen (as did his immediate predecessors) a course of retrenchment and hostility or, alternatively, a course of rapprochement modelled on détente in which the basic status quo would be retained. Further, whatever the condition of the Soviet system and communist rule in Eastern Europe, combined Warsaw Pact forces still enjoyed a considerable advantage over NATO and Gorbachev could have used this to exercise a veto over change in 1989–90. That he chose not to reflected less a surrender in the face of a Western resolve than a judgement that a certain reconfiguration of European security was both necessary and desirable. This was a judgement born of some very practical concerns (not least, the diminishing strategic significance of the region for Soviet security) but, as several studies have convincingly shown, it was informed also by a veritable revolution in the ideational and ideological bases of Soviet foreign policy.35

(p.38) That ideological change may have simply rationalised material necessity is a fair point. However, as noted above, ideology did have a more autonomous influence during the Cold War and certainly within the Soviet system it exercised a powerful effect upon the political, even intellectual outlook of its leadership. In the case of the political circle around Gorbachev, ideological revision occurred through a number of intellectual routes. This is not the place to rehearse the full body of ideas associated with what became known as ‘the new political thinking’. In short, however, it recognised two significant anomalies that challenged Soviet ideology: first, the continuing economic vitality of the capitalist system (and related to this the fact that capitalism was not inherently aggressive) and second, socialism’s inability to confront capitalism in a revolutionary struggle because of the danger of nuclear annihilation. Ever since the death of Stalin, the Soviet leadership had been aware of these tensions, but had not drawn the dramatic conclusions of Gorbachev, namely that socialism was not, after all, a superior form of social organisation that would eventually triumph over its capitalist rival. Gorbachev’s volte-face meant that in one fell swoop the fundamental ideological antagonism that lay at the heart of the Cold War was removed.36 From this a basic foreign policy consequence followed – that the Soviet Union’s best course lay in a deepening of cooperation with the West rather than a continuing and steadfast opposition to it.

The shift in Soviet ideology was significant not only because of its impact in helping end the Cold War but also because the new political thinking posited a more inclusive approach to the international politics of Europe, to East-West relations and to issues of security in general. This may have had a hackneyed and imprecise feel at times (the notions of ‘interdependence’ and ‘pan-human values’, for instance). Yet it was based on a compromise with a set of values and a vision of order in Europe that was more Western than Soviet (or socialist) in inspiration. It is unimaginable, for instance, that any of Gorbachev’s predecessors would have signed the Paris Charter given its endorsement of pluralistic democracy and economic liberalism, as well as its assertion that friendly relations between states rested upon the consolidation of democracy. Similarly, it is hard to imagine any Soviet Foreign Minister other than Eduard Shevardnadze (who served under Gorbachev) declaring that the Soviet Union’s status as a ‘civilized country’ depended on its successful construction of a ‘law-ruled and democratic state’, and its participation in ‘the creation of an integral European economic, legal, humanitarian, cultural and ecological space’.37 On this basis, a clear connection existed between the new political thinking, Soviet policy concessions and actual developments in European security. Consider the following: ‘mutual security’, ‘defensive defence’ and ‘reasonable sufficiency in defence’ (linked to the INF and CFE Treaties plus unilateral Soviet troop reductions in Eastern Europe); ‘freedom of choice’ (Soviet non-intervention to prevent the removal of communist rule in Eastern Europe and acceptance of German unification); and the ‘common European home’ (the revamping of the CSCE in 1990 and the establishment by Moscow of ties with the Council of Europe).38

(p.39) There were, however, limits to how fast and how far the Gorbachev leadership was prepared to go. A unified Germany in NATO was neither foreseen nor desired. That it was accepted reflected intellectual consistency on Gorbachev’s part (an extension of the ‘freedom of choice’ principle to the German case), but equally the persuasive effects of German and American economic blandishments and strategic assurances.39 Similarly, Gorbachev was not prepared for the removal of communist rule in Eastern Europe and judged that more popular forms of socialism could be introduced into the region. When this was proven wrong he remained committed to the survival of the Warsaw Pact, if not as a military bloc of the Cold War variety, then as a political organisation able to maintain existing Soviet links with the region. This might suggest that Gorbachev, for all his boldness, remained wedded to bloc thinking. However, underlying his position was a hope (expressed during 1990) that changes in the Warsaw Pact would be mirrored in NATO and, with the Cold War over, that these ‘existing security mechanisms and structures in Europe’ would be preserved only until the ‘establishment of new all-European structures of collective security’, based preferably on the CSCE.40 This stance was, in turn, premised on the assumption that the Soviet Union itself would continue to play a shaping role in Europe and that its status as a great power (albeit one premised as much on a claim to a new moral leadership as much as military power) would be maintained.41

Given the decline of the Soviet position after 1989, these expectations may have seemed misguided. They were, however, encouraged by other authoritative voices. In France, President Francois Mitterand outlined in December 1989 a vision of a ‘European Confederation’ that would ‘associate all the states of our continent in a common organisation with permanent exchanges of peace and security’.42 In West Germany, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher argued during 1990 in favour of a ‘pan-European co-operative security order’ oriented around the CSCE that would ‘bring about more stability for the whole of Europe [… and would] take account of the Soviet Union’s legitimate security interests’. This would, moreover, entail cooperation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO and these two alliances would be first ‘overarched’ and eventually ‘absorbed’ within a new order.43 New post-communist governments in Eastern Europe also trailed similar positions. A Czechoslovak proposal of March 1990 envisaged the creation of European Security Commission (again based on the CSCE) that would see the ‘gradual integration’ of Eastern Europe into ‘all-European integration processes’ and with this a withering away of the two alliances ‘which until now have divided Europe’.44

Institutional developments also suggested a more cooperative period of European security was being ushered in. German unification, achieved during 1990, removed one defining feature of the Cold War. NATO, meanwhile, in its London Declaration of July 1990 asserted that the Alliance and the Warsaw Pact were ‘no longer adversaries’ and that it would extend to the countries of the east ‘the hand of friendship’. More specifically, the Declaration pledged to reduce NATO’s reliance on nuclear forces, scale back conventional forces and work with (p.40) a CSCE that ‘should become more prominent in Europe’s future’. Reflecting these shifts, the Alliance also foresaw a broadening of the European security agenda. NATO would continue to provide for common defence but at the same time it was suggested that security could no longer be seen as laying ‘solely in the military dimension’; conflict resolution and support for ‘the structures of a more united continent’ were also of increasing importance.45 Moscow, for its part, had undertaken a fundamental reappraisal of the Alliance. Shevardnadze visited NATO HQ in December 1989 and referred to its stabilising role in Europe, while Gorbachev viewed the Alliance as a means of anchoring a unified Germany. Capping this rapprochement, NATO and the Warsaw Pact issued a joint statement at the CSCE summit in Paris that affirmed ‘the end of the era of division and confrontation’ and looked forward to ‘a continuing process of cooperation’.46

Thus, the winding down of the Cold War seemed to expand the range of institutional possibilities. This was true first and foremost for the CSCE. As many of the comments above suggest, this organisation was the receptacle of all manner of proposals for empowerment, and some of these were, in fact, realised with the establishment of permanent institutional structures and new missions at the CSCE’s Paris summit in November 1990. The Council of Europe, for its part, extended special guest status to the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia in June 1989. In 1990, Hungary became the first former communist state to attain full membership, and Czechoslovakia and Poland followed in 1991. The EC was also affected. The end of the Cold War galvanised discussion in Western Europe on the role of the Community in promoting pan-European structures, engaging the Soviet Union and its erstwhile allies, and developing an institutionalised European competence in security and defence.

The end of the Cold War and the limits of inclusion

The Cold War ended in Europe owing in large part to shifts in Soviet thinking and policy, reciprocated, in turn, by an abandonment in the West of an image of Moscow as ‘an ideologically committed permanent adversary’.47 This rapprochement found practical expression in a series of policy initiatives which seemingly foreshadowed an inclusive post-Cold War security order. These efforts reached a high-point at the end of the 1990 with German unification, the CSCE summit in Paris and the signing of the CFE Treaty. Thereafter, however, the limitations of this new ‘security architecture’ (as it was dubbed at the time) became increasingly apparent. Most notably, during 1991 both the CSCE and the EC were tested and found wanting in Yugoslavia. Neither organisation fared any better in dealing with the mass exodus of refugees from Albania to Italy. The unfolding disintegration of the Soviet Union, meanwhile, posed a raft of uncertainties for Western states and organisations: whether or not to provide economic assistance, how far to cultivate relations with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, how to deal with Soviet republics on the verge of independence, how to (p.41) assess the fate of the Soviet military, how to ensure the implementation of arms control and other agreements and so on. These developments severely dampened the pan-European notions of the previous year and not only because Gorbachev, one of its ostensible advocates, was politically beleaguered. East European states tempered their enthusiasm for the CSCE in favour of links with NATO and the EC, and in certain Western states (the US and the UK, most notably, but also in the Netherlands, Denmark and Portugal) the case for NATO-centrism was strengthened.

The emergence of this more qualified version of pan-European security also had much to do with policy preferences pursued by the US (and supported with differing degrees of enthusiasm by other NATO states). As Simon Nuttall has argued, the US at this juncture decided to remain a power in Europe and was that much more agile in responding to the changes spreading across the continent than European governments (whether acting alone or in concert through the EC).48 In its public statements, the American leadership held to a vision that was ostensibly inclusive. President George Bush Sr spoke during 1989–90 of an emerging Europe that would be ‘whole and free’. As he later explained, this ought not to have ‘come at the expense of other nations. It had to come with and through them – both East and West. We could not cast the changes around us in terms of winners and losers.’49 Brent Scowcroft, Bush’s National Security Advisor, suggested similarly, that American policy was aimed at ‘developing a common vision […] the kind of post-Cold War Europe not only that we and our allies would want to see emerge, but also one in which the Soviets would recognise their own stake […].’50

Just how far the Soviet stake was taken into account is, however, a moot point. The American vision was, after all, premised on the decline of communist rule in Eastern Europe and the retreat of Soviet power. The Bush administration was compelled by a need to rationalise a strategy of active engagement in a changing Europe, while at the same time making the most of a new-found position of influence to push its own policy preferences – simultaneously advertising these as for the good of European states (or, in the case of the Soviet Union, at least a tolerable alternative). In so doing, it was mindful of a certain dissension within the Alliance (voiced by France most notably and, at times by the West German Foreign Minister), a need to accommodate (even balance) an increasingly assertive EC, and growing opportunities for engagement with Eastern Europe. The result was a set of policies through 1989–91 geared towards the preservation of a US military presence in Europe, the continuation of NATO as the West’s principal instrument of security, the achievement of a unified Germany in NATO, and a continuous dialogue with Moscow in order to exploit the opportunities provided by the Gorbachev leadership.51

These objectives meant that US policy was prepared to accord an important role to both the EC and the CSCE but nonetheless sought to deflate pan-European sentiments emanating from Moscow, Paris, the West German foreign ministry and parts of Eastern Europe. These views could not be ignored altogether given (p.42) their broad (if momentary) support and the fact that, in the shape of an emphasis on the CSCE, they had one important thing in common.52 The US, however, held deep reservations about the CSCE owing to its large membership, rules of consensus, and absence of permanent political institutions. On these grounds, during 1990 it resisted Soviet suggestions that the body be a forum for discussing the German question. Equally emphatically, the US opposed any suggestion that it supplant NATO.53 The CSCE was, however, useful for other purposes. In a speech in December 1989, Secretary of State James Baker referred to it as one element of ‘a new (security) architecture for a new era’ that also embraced NATO, the EC and the Council of Europe. At a CSCE conference on the ‘human dimension’ in June 1990, Baker labelled it the ‘conscience of the continent’ and noted the CSCE’s potential role in spreading democratic values and, more practically, monitoring free elections.54 One month later, NATO’s London Declaration was adopted. This was based on an American draft and contained a section on a ‘more prominent’ CSCE that foresaw the establishment of permanent bodies dedicated to conflict prevention, confidence-building measures and election monitoring.55 These, in effect, were the proposals adopted at the organisation’s Paris summit later that year.56

These reforms afforded a CSCE, however, that fell short of the ambitions of some in Europe. US policy (tacitly endorsed by NATO) had effectively blocked the development of the organisation as a security body of military consequence and had limited its new missions to political, economic and ‘soft’ security matters. These were not unimportant and, moreover, the CSCE had retained its unique pan-European quality. Yet for all this, its new functions were delimited so as not to encroach upon NATO’s prerogatives; the CSCE would, in the words of NATO’s 1991 Strategic Concept, be ‘complementary’ (that is, not in contradiction) with the aims of the Alliance.57

American advocacy of NATO also meant an assertion of the Alliance above the EC as Europe’s principal security actor. Yet on this score, the process of institutional realignment was less clear-cut. The US had viewed European integration throughout the Cold War as reinforcing the transatlantic alliance and Baker’s notion of European architecture was premised on a strengthened US-EC relationship with the latter playing a central role ‘in shaping the New Europe’.58 Within Europe also at this juncture there was, as already noted, the emergence of debate on the EC’s political and security roles. Yet during the crucial years of 1989–90, this debate was to some extent crowded out by the attention devoted to other concerns more urgent for EC member states, not least the implications of German unification and internal matters such as the introduction of the single market and the inter-governmental conferences on monetary and political union. What these developments did mean, however, was that amidst the turmoil of the Cold War’s end, the EC was undergoing its own quiet revolution. This theme will be developed further in Chapter 5, but for now the crucial point is that as well as a US-sponsored NATO, the EC was also set to play a significant (albeit at this stage, uncertain) role in shaping the wider post-Cold War Europe.

(p.43) The Cold War settlement

The end of the Cold War has been likened to two other concluding moments of global war in the twentieth century: 1919 and 1945.59 The comparison has its limitations. The main protagonists after 1989 tended to avoid the language of victory and defeat; the complicity of the ‘defeated’ Soviet Union was, after all, essential in framing the terms of the Cold War’s end. Further, the Cold War did not conclude in a formal peace settlement as such – there was no peace treaty, no document outlining the spoils of the victor. Yet in 1989–91, just like 1919 and 1945, there was an effort on the part of the victorious states to institute a peace and to entrench the values which guided their ‘wartime’ efforts.

Ian Clarke has referred to this process as entailing a ‘distributive settlement’, a settlement which marked ‘the changes consequent upon the new distribution of power, and the material/territorial embodiments of that new situation’. While this settlement has only become fully apparent as the post-Cold War period has unfolded, its essential features were laid down in the short period after 1989 and, as such, involved a united Germany in NATO, the end of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.60 The end result of these developments, according to Clark, was clear:

[s]overeignty over territory was redistributed; existing spheres of influence and tutelage were abrogated; deployments of military power were fundamentally shifted; and the economic and political complexion of many states was radically transformed […] There can scarcely be any better example of a ‘hegemonic war’ that has so […] fundamentally redrawn the international balance of power.61

This settlement did not involve a process of new institutional creation akin to the establishment of the League of Nations after the First World War or the UN after the Second World War. What it did rather was to entrench the position of those institutions (NATO and the EC particularly) which serviced the winning coalition of the West. This was made possible by the extent of the power differential which the West enjoyed in Europe and attractive because of the functional benefits and institutional assets which these bodies already possessed.62 NATO and the EC were not entirely complementary, in the sense that they represented two different parts of the Western coalition and two different (although not necessarily competing) visions of the new Europe. However, both shared the common feature that at the Cold War’s end, they excluded, by definition, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The institutional balance of Europe, in other words, was not comprehensive (a state of affairs reinforced by the waning of the CSCE option). The place of the East within this new configuration was either increasingly marginal (as in the case of the Soviet Union) or the subject of engagement and co-option by the West on its terms. In a Europe dominated by one side of the Cold War, inclusion could thus occur only by joining the winning side.63

(p.44) As well as its distributive component, the end of the Cold War was also occasioned by what Clarke has referred to as a ‘regulative settlement’. This comprised the ongoing march (into ex-communist states) of the norms associated with the global market economy, a reformulation of the meaning and practices of security, and the ‘continued assertion of a liberal rights order’.64 The latter reflected the dénouement of the ideological contestation of the Cold War and, indeed, arguably marked one of the decisive historical outcomes of the twentieth century. In the northern hemisphere, liberal democracy as a form of political, military and economic organisation had proven itself superior not just to communism, but to autocratic monarchy and fascism also.65

This seeming triumph led to a good deal of hyperbole at the time, expressed not least in President Bush’s notion of a ‘new world order’ and, in a more intellectual fashion, in the idea of the ‘end of history’.66 These notions were consequently criticised, even ridiculed, for over-optimistically anticipating a new dawn of international cooperation. Put more modestly, however, the end of the Cold War did see confirmed those organising principles which had cemented Western Europe and North America for the previous four decades. The constitutional marker of this position was the documents adopted by the CSCE during 1990–91. The Charter of Paris was significant because of its emphasis on a recognisably Western version of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.67 The final document of the CSCE’s Moscow conference on the human dimension in October 1991, meanwhile, affirmed that such values framed the participation of states in international society; they ‘do not’, the document asserted, ‘belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the state concerned’.68 What made these documents doubly significant, moreover, was their comprehensive endorsement, every state then extant in North America and Europe (with the sole exception of Albania in the case of the Charter of Paris) being a signatory.

This state of affairs, then, could be taken as holding out the potential for inclusiveness in so far as it seemingly reflected an emerging convergence of values across the continent. Such a view, however, needs to square with the fact that this was an uneven outcome. The triumph of liberal, ‘Westernistic’ values reflected the material and ideational balance of power at the Cold War’s end. As such, these values justified the conservation of political order in the West, while at the same time marking out the criteria by which this order would be extended to embrace those who had previously been outsiders.69

Taken as a whole, the distributive and regulative settlements of the Cold War made possible new debates on the scope and meaning of Europe as a political entity, the place and role of existing institutions within it, and the values against which state behaviour in Europe (both domestically and externally) would be judged. These three processes were to hold important implications of inclusion and exclusion in the post-Cold War period, as we shall see in the next chapter.

(p.45) Notes

(1) A. Roberts, ‘A New Age in International Relations?’, International Affairs, Vol. 67(3), 1991, p. 509.

(2) F. Halliday, ‘A New Global Configuration’, in K. Booth and T. Dunne (eds), Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 234–41.

(3) These three broad historical processes made up the ‘composite phenomenon’ of the end of the Cold War. See F. Halliday, Rethinking International Relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), p. 218.

(4) E. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991 (London: Michael Joseph, 1994), p. 256.

(5) As a basic characteristic of international and specifically European politics the Cold War in this volume is regarded as extending from the breakdown of post-War Soviet-Allied cooperation (roughly in 1946–47) to the years 1989–91 when the essential features of Cold War rivalry were dismantled.

(6) J.L. Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 26.

(7) B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup, P. Lemaitre et al., The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for a Post-Cold War Era (London and New York: Pinter, 1990), p. 31.

(8) O.A. Westad, ‘Introduction: Reviewing the Cold War’, in O.A. Westad (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 1–26.

(9) R. Jervis, ‘Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 3(1), 2001, p. 58.

(10) For analytical convenience, this chapter refers to the EC. The EU only came into existence, legally speaking, with the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, that is, after the historical period covered here.

(11) M. Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (London: Penguin Books, 1998), p. 249.

(12) Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes, p. 228; G.A. Craig and A.L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (Third edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 105.

(13) W. Loth, The Division of the World, 1941–1955 (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 299.

(14) G. Lundestad, ‘Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 23(3), 1986, pp. 269–72.

(15) G. Lundestad, ‘Empire’ by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), especially pp. 1–28.

(16) H. Hakovirta, East-West Conflict and European Neutrality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 48–51.

(17) G-H. Sotou, ‘Was there a European Order in the Twentieth Century? From the Concert of Europe to the End of the Cold War’, Contemporary European History, Vol. 9(3), 2002, pp. 341–3.

(18) C. Bell, The Diplomacy of Détente: The Kissinger Era (London: Martin Robertson, 1977), pp. 108–9.

(19) W. Wallace, ‘Rethinking European Order: West European Responses, 1989–97 – Introduction’, in R. Niblett and W. Wallace (eds), Rethinking European Order: West European Responses, 1989–97 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 1.

(20) D. Deudney and G.J. Ikenberry, ‘The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 25(2), 1999, pp. 179–96; G.J. Ikenberry, ‘The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75(3), 1996, pp. 79–91.

(p.46) (21) K.W. Deutsch, S.A. Burrell, R.A. Kann et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 5.

(22) J.L. Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

(23) A.C. Janos, ‘From Eastern Empire to Western Hegemony: East Central Europe under Two International Regimes’, East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 15(2), 2001, pp. 224–31.

(24) M. Kramer, ‘Ideology and the Cold War’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 25(4), 1999, p. 540, note 7.

(25) Ibid., p. 573.

(26) C. D. Blacker, Hostage to Revolution: Gorbachev and Soviet Security Policy, 1985–1991 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), pp. 14–17.

(27) Kramer, ‘Ideology and the Cold War’, passim.

(28) V. Mastny, ‘The New History of Cold War Alliances’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 4(2), 2002, pp. 80–1.

(29) This related, among other things, to how the global influence of Moscow was affected by relations with China and by revolutionary developments in the Third World.

(30) The Chernenko quote is from R.L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 170. Compare this with leading Soviet official Andrei Zhdanov’s reference to ‘the expansionist programme of the United States’ and ‘bid for world supremacy’ in a speech given in 1947 cited in Gaddis, We Now Know, p. 46.

(31) J. Mueller, ‘The Impact of Ideas on Grand Strategy’, in R. Rosencrance and A.A. Stein (eds), The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 50–1.

(32) V. Mastny, ‘Did NATO Win the Cold War? Looking over the Wall’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78(3), 1999, pp. 176–89.

(33) O. Njølstad, ‘Introduction: The Cold War in the 1980s’, in O. Njølstad (ed.), The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation (London and New York: Frank Cass, 2004), p. xiii.

(34) These are summarised in M. Webber, The International Politics of Russia and the Successor States (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996), Chapter 1.

(35) For example, V.M. Zubok, ‘Why Did the Cold War End in 1989? Explanations of “The Turn”’, in Westad (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War, pp. 343–67.

(36) C. Wallander, ‘Lost and Found: Gorbachev’s “New Political Thinking”’, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25(1), 2001, p. 118.

(37) Cited in N. Malcolm, ‘New Thinking and After: Debate in Moscow about Europe’, in N. Malcolm (ed.), Russia and Europe: An End to Confrontation? (London: Pinter/ Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994), p. 160.

(38) R. Craig Nation, Black Earth, Red Star (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), Chapter 8.

(39) T. Risse, ‘The Cold War’s Endgame and German Unification’, International Security, Vol. 21(4), 1997, pp. 159–85. See also M. Gorbachev, Memoirs (London: Bantam Books, 1997), pp. 666–91.

(40) ‘On Directives for the Negotiations of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR with US President G. Bush and Secretary of State J. Baker’ (April 1990) as cited in Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 612; Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 683.

(41) D.W. Larson and A. Shevchenko, ‘Shortcut to Greatness: The New Thinking and the Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy’, International Organisation, Vol. 57(1), 2003, pp. 96–7.

(42) Le Monde, 2 January 1990, reprinted in V. Mastny (ed.), The Helsinki Process and the Reintegration of Europe, 1986–1991: Analysis and Documentation (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992), pp. 203–4.

(p.47) (43) Speech in Potsdam, February 1990, reprinted in A.D. Rotfeld and W. Stützle (eds), Germany and Europe in Transition (Oxford: Oxford University Press/Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1991), pp. 20–9.

(44) Reprinted in ibid., pp. 138–41.

(45) London Declaration on a Transformed Atlantic Alliance, reprinted in ibid., pp. 150–1.

(46) Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two State, in ibid., pp. 217–19.

(47) R. Garthoff, ‘Who is to Blame for the Cold War?’, in K. Booth (ed.), Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 65.

(48) S. Nuttall, European Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 40, 55–6.

(49) G. Bush and B. Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), p. 231.

(50) Ibid., p. 230.

(51) R.L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Account of US Policy in Europe, 1989–1992 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), pp. 150–4.

(52) P. Zelikow and C. Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 443, note 105.

(53) This position was also firmly supported by the Thatcher government in Britain, and by the NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner. It was somewhat less firmly backed by West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his Defence Minister Rudolph Stoltenberg.

(54) Hutchings, American Diplomacy, pp. 163–4, 194–5.

(55) Rotfeld and Schültze (eds), Germany and Europe in Transition, p. 152.

(56) Hutchings, American Diplomacy, p. 285.

(57) The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (November 1991), paragraph 4 at: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108a.htm [5 January 2006].

(58) Baker cited in Nuttall, European Foreign Policy, p. 62.

(59) R. Steel, ‘Prologue: 1919–1945–1989’, in M.F. Boemke, G.D. Feldman and E. Glaser (eds), The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 21–34.

(60) I. Clark, The Post-Cold War Order: The Spoils of Peace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 78–82.

(61) Ibid., p. 84.

(62) G.J. Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 70–2.

(63) Clark, The Post-Cold War Order, p. 247.

(64) Ibid., p. 78.

(65) B. Buzan, ‘The Present as a Historic Turning Point’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 30(4), 1995, pp. 387–8.

(66) See T.B. Miller, ‘A New World Order?’, The World Today, Vol. 48(1), 1992, pp. 7–9; F. Fukuyama, ‘The End of History’, National Interest, No. 16, summer, 1989, pp. 3–18.

(67) On the ‘constitutional’ significance of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe see P. Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History (London: Allen Lane, 2002), pp. 636–8.

(68) Cited in Hutchings, American Diplomacy, p. 298.

(69) Clark, The Post-Cold War Order, pp. 246–7; O. Wæver, ‘European Security Identities 2000’, in J.P. Burgess and O. Tunander (eds), European Security Identities: Contested Understandings of EU and NATO (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 2000), pp. 43–4.

Notes:

(1) A. Roberts, ‘A New Age in International Relations?’, International Affairs, Vol. 67(3), 1991, p. 509.

(2) F. Halliday, ‘A New Global Configuration’, in K. Booth and T. Dunne (eds), Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 234–41.

(3) These three broad historical processes made up the ‘composite phenomenon’ of the end of the Cold War. See F. Halliday, Rethinking International Relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), p. 218.

(4) E. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991 (London: Michael Joseph, 1994), p. 256.

(5) As a basic characteristic of international and specifically European politics the Cold War in this volume is regarded as extending from the breakdown of post-War Soviet-Allied cooperation (roughly in 1946–47) to the years 1989–91 when the essential features of Cold War rivalry were dismantled.

(6) J.L. Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 26.

(7) B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup, P. Lemaitre et al., The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for a Post-Cold War Era (London and New York: Pinter, 1990), p. 31.

(8) O.A. Westad, ‘Introduction: Reviewing the Cold War’, in O.A. Westad (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 1–26.

(9) R. Jervis, ‘Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 3(1), 2001, p. 58.

(10) For analytical convenience, this chapter refers to the EC. The EU only came into existence, legally speaking, with the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, that is, after the historical period covered here.

(11) M. Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (London: Penguin Books, 1998), p. 249.

(12) Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes, p. 228; G.A. Craig and A.L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (Third edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 105.

(13) W. Loth, The Division of the World, 1941–1955 (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 299.

(14) G. Lundestad, ‘Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 23(3), 1986, pp. 269–72.

(15) G. Lundestad, ‘Empire’ by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), especially pp. 1–28.

(16) H. Hakovirta, East-West Conflict and European Neutrality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 48–51.

(17) G-H. Sotou, ‘Was there a European Order in the Twentieth Century? From the Concert of Europe to the End of the Cold War’, Contemporary European History, Vol. 9(3), 2002, pp. 341–3.

(18) C. Bell, The Diplomacy of Détente: The Kissinger Era (London: Martin Robertson, 1977), pp. 108–9.

(19) W. Wallace, ‘Rethinking European Order: West European Responses, 1989–97 – Introduction’, in R. Niblett and W. Wallace (eds), Rethinking European Order: West European Responses, 1989–97 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 1.

(20) D. Deudney and G.J. Ikenberry, ‘The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 25(2), 1999, pp. 179–96; G.J. Ikenberry, ‘The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75(3), 1996, pp. 79–91.

(p.46) (21) K.W. Deutsch, S.A. Burrell, R.A. Kann et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 5.

(22) J.L. Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

(23) A.C. Janos, ‘From Eastern Empire to Western Hegemony: East Central Europe under Two International Regimes’, East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 15(2), 2001, pp. 224–31.

(24) M. Kramer, ‘Ideology and the Cold War’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 25(4), 1999, p. 540, note 7.

(25) Ibid., p. 573.

(26) C. D. Blacker, Hostage to Revolution: Gorbachev and Soviet Security Policy, 1985–1991 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), pp. 14–17.

(27) Kramer, ‘Ideology and the Cold War’, passim.

(28) V. Mastny, ‘The New History of Cold War Alliances’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 4(2), 2002, pp. 80–1.

(29) This related, among other things, to how the global influence of Moscow was affected by relations with China and by revolutionary developments in the Third World.

(30) The Chernenko quote is from R.L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 170. Compare this with leading Soviet official Andrei Zhdanov’s reference to ‘the expansionist programme of the United States’ and ‘bid for world supremacy’ in a speech given in 1947 cited in Gaddis, We Now Know, p. 46.

(31) J. Mueller, ‘The Impact of Ideas on Grand Strategy’, in R. Rosencrance and A.A. Stein (eds), The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 50–1.

(32) V. Mastny, ‘Did NATO Win the Cold War? Looking over the Wall’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78(3), 1999, pp. 176–89.

(33) O. Njølstad, ‘Introduction: The Cold War in the 1980s’, in O. Njølstad (ed.), The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation (London and New York: Frank Cass, 2004), p. xiii.

(34) These are summarised in M. Webber, The International Politics of Russia and the Successor States (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996), Chapter 1.

(35) For example, V.M. Zubok, ‘Why Did the Cold War End in 1989? Explanations of “The Turn”’, in Westad (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War, pp. 343–67.

(36) C. Wallander, ‘Lost and Found: Gorbachev’s “New Political Thinking”’, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25(1), 2001, p. 118.

(37) Cited in N. Malcolm, ‘New Thinking and After: Debate in Moscow about Europe’, in N. Malcolm (ed.), Russia and Europe: An End to Confrontation? (London: Pinter/ Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994), p. 160.

(38) R. Craig Nation, Black Earth, Red Star (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), Chapter 8.

(39) T. Risse, ‘The Cold War’s Endgame and German Unification’, International Security, Vol. 21(4), 1997, pp. 159–85. See also M. Gorbachev, Memoirs (London: Bantam Books, 1997), pp. 666–91.

(40) ‘On Directives for the Negotiations of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR with US President G. Bush and Secretary of State J. Baker’ (April 1990) as cited in Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 612; Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 683.

(41) D.W. Larson and A. Shevchenko, ‘Shortcut to Greatness: The New Thinking and the Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy’, International Organisation, Vol. 57(1), 2003, pp. 96–7.

(42) Le Monde, 2 January 1990, reprinted in V. Mastny (ed.), The Helsinki Process and the Reintegration of Europe, 1986–1991: Analysis and Documentation (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992), pp. 203–4.

(p.47) (43) Speech in Potsdam, February 1990, reprinted in A.D. Rotfeld and W. Stützle (eds), Germany and Europe in Transition (Oxford: Oxford University Press/Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1991), pp. 20–9.

(44) Reprinted in ibid., pp. 138–41.

(45) London Declaration on a Transformed Atlantic Alliance, reprinted in ibid., pp. 150–1.

(46) Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two State, in ibid., pp. 217–19.

(47) R. Garthoff, ‘Who is to Blame for the Cold War?’, in K. Booth (ed.), Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 65.

(48) S. Nuttall, European Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 40, 55–6.

(49) G. Bush and B. Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), p. 231.

(50) Ibid., p. 230.

(51) R.L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Account of US Policy in Europe, 1989–1992 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), pp. 150–4.

(52) P. Zelikow and C. Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 443, note 105.

(53) This position was also firmly supported by the Thatcher government in Britain, and by the NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner. It was somewhat less firmly backed by West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his Defence Minister Rudolph Stoltenberg.

(54) Hutchings, American Diplomacy, pp. 163–4, 194–5.

(55) Rotfeld and Schültze (eds), Germany and Europe in Transition, p. 152.

(56) Hutchings, American Diplomacy, p. 285.

(57) The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (November 1991), paragraph 4 at: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108a.htm [5 January 2006].

(58) Baker cited in Nuttall, European Foreign Policy, p. 62.

(59) R. Steel, ‘Prologue: 1919–1945–1989’, in M.F. Boemke, G.D. Feldman and E. Glaser (eds), The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 21–34.

(60) I. Clark, The Post-Cold War Order: The Spoils of Peace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 78–82.

(61) Ibid., p. 84.

(62) G.J. Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 70–2.

(63) Clark, The Post-Cold War Order, p. 247.

(64) Ibid., p. 78.

(65) B. Buzan, ‘The Present as a Historic Turning Point’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 30(4), 1995, pp. 387–8.

(66) See T.B. Miller, ‘A New World Order?’, The World Today, Vol. 48(1), 1992, pp. 7–9; F. Fukuyama, ‘The End of History’, National Interest, No. 16, summer, 1989, pp. 3–18.

(67) On the ‘constitutional’ significance of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe see P. Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History (London: Allen Lane, 2002), pp. 636–8.

(68) Cited in Hutchings, American Diplomacy, p. 298.

(69) Clark, The Post-Cold War Order, pp. 246–7; O. Wæver, ‘European Security Identities 2000’, in J.P. Burgess and O. Tunander (eds), European Security Identities: Contested Understandings of EU and NATO (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 2000), pp. 43–4.